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Sanctions Screening

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Sanctioned Entity Found

KIRIYENKO Sergei Vladilenovich

Date of Birth: 1962-07-26

Type: individual

Updated: 2026-06-23 05:08:32

Accuracy: 90

Information:

individual
UKRAINE-EO13661] [RUSSIA-EO14024
DOB 26 Jul 1962; POB Sukhumi, Georgia; nationality Russia; Gender Male; Secondary sanctions risk: Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR 589.201 and/or 589.209; alt. Secondary sanctions risk: See Section 11 of Executive Order 14024.

Source: https://sanctionslistservice.ofac.treas.gov/api/PublicationPreview/exports/SDN.CSV

Kiriyenko Sergei Vladilenovich

Date of Birth: 0000-00-00

Type: individual

Updated: 2026-06-23 04:16:14

Accuracy: 90

Information:

This individual is included in the “Putin List.” The “Putin List” database is compiled by the Free Russia Forum for the purpose of identifying, consolidating, and systematizing public and other data on individuals responsible for the creation and operation of a system of power usurpation and suppression of civil liberties in Russia, an aggressive foreign policy that threatens international security, as well as corruption and state propaganda.

Source: https://spisok-putina.org/individuals/kirienko

Sergei Vladilenovich KIRIYENKO

Date of Birth: 1962-07-26

Type: individual

Updated: 2026-06-23 05:08:32

Accuracy: 75

Information:

Position: First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office
Nationality: Russia
Birthplace: Sukhumi
Regime: Chemical Weapons
Info: (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0012. (UK Statement of Reasons):As First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation, Sergei Kiriyenko is responsible for domestic affairs. The Presidential Office is a state body within Russia that provides support for the President’s work, monitors the implementation of the President’s decisions, and has responsibility for governmental policy and the regime’s most important actions domestically. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. The activities and movements of Alexei Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020 were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the role of the state within the attack, and the scale of the operation against Navalny, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexey Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. (Gender):Male

Source: https://ofsistorage.blob.core.windows.net/publishlive/2022format/ConList.csv